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Abstract—A phased mission is one in which the requirements
may alter over time. We present a novel approach to analyse
phased mission systems using probabilistic timed automata (PTA).
We show how to construct PTA models which allow one to
reflect system uncertainty, and how to analyse these models
using the PRISM probabilistic model checker. We illustrate our
approach via a simple case study, namely path planning for a
Mars exploration rover, since the mission of the rover can be
expected to be an instance of phased mission systems.
Keywords—phased mission systems; uncertainty analysis; for-
mal methods; probabilistic timed automata; probabilistic model
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I. INTRODUCTION
A phased mission [1] is one in which the requirements may
alter over time. Mission success depends on the success of
all of the individual phases. For example, consider an aircraft
whose operation consists of a number of phases, including:
taxiing, taking off, climbing to the correct altitude, cruising,
descending, landing, and taxiing back to the terminal. Uncer-
tainty analysis allows us to predict phase failure probabilities
and thus compute the overall probability of mission failure.
In a phased mission system (PMS), different phases may
have different logical structures. The system unit may be in-
volved in different tasks, and vary in each phase. For example,
space monitoring and control communication system refers
to the systems which track, monitor and control the various
stages of the spacecraft and its payload. Its reliability is directly
related to successfully launching spacecraft, changing orbit and
other tasks.
Many aerospace applications are PMSs. Communication
monitoring varies between the stages but in order to understand
the overall communication program, communication within
each stage must be analysed.
In recent years the analysis of PMSs has developed into
an important research area. Some researchers have focused on
the problem of phase independence, mainly using Fault Tree
Analysis and state-space-based analytical methods, including
Markov methods and Petri Nets [2], [3]. But, with the growing
number of the system construction, it is more difficult to be
applied to these systems.
Other approaches for analysing PMSs involve simulation
and testing. Simulation is insufficient for analyising this type
of complex system since it only allows for partial coverage. We
consider a numerical analysis technique based on Probabilistic
Timed Automata (PTAs). PTAs allow us to model systems
which have both probabilistic and timed behaviours, and to
analyze them with respect to a range of associated properties.
In this paper, we propose a method based on PTAs to
evaluate quantitative properties of PMSs. This method allows
us to solve specific problems in the practical operation of PMS
systems. In general, traditional analysis methods do not allow
for the modelling of uncertainty within a system. For example,
they do not allow for uncertainty in event ordering, or in the
timing of events. It might not be possible to determine a priori
the exact time at which an event will occur, it is more likely
that a time interval during which the event would occur (with
a given probability) could be predicted. Without the inclusion
of this type of uncertainty, PMS planning is unreliable, and
consequently PMSs may be unpredictable and unsafe.
This paper describes how PTAs can be used to model
PMSs with uncertainty. The aim of the paper is to promote
the adoption of such an approach for modelling PMSs. PTAs
are analysed using probabilistic model checking. Probabilistic
model checking involves creating a probabilistic model (based
on a Markov chain) of a system. In this model events have
probabilities and transistions may have associated rewards.
Properties of the overall system can be verified using prob-
abilistic stochastic logic. Examples of such properties involve
the maximum or minimum probabilities of the likelihood of a
situation occurring within a given time interval, or the expected
cumulative reward.
The method is described in several steps as follows. First,
we introduce the concept of a PMS and its technology. Second,
we give technical background on traditional techniques and
time dependent techniques. Third, we introduce probabilistic
model checking technology, and present the definition and
formal specification of quantitative properties of PTAs. Then,
a case study is provided to illustrate the approach, and we use
formal methods to analyse the PTA models. Finally we present
our conclusions and outline directions for future research.
II. ANALYSIS TECHNIQUES
A. Traditional Techniques
In order to analyse PMSs, a number of analysis techniques
have been developed, such as Event Tree Analysis (ETA),978-1-5090-0382-2/16/$31.00 c 2016 IEEE
Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) [4], and Binary Decision Diagrams
(BDDs) [5], [6]. We outline some of these techniques below,
for more details see [7].
ETA involves determining a trace of events that lead to a
failure/accident (but not the specific event that led to it). On
the other hand, FTA is a method that examines relationships
between the subsystems and components of a system in order
to find the root cause of a failure [8]. A graphical representa-
tion of the different combinations of events that lead to failure
is used to identify failure causes, be they due to software error,
user error, or otherwise [9]–[11]. FTA analysis is carried out
in two ways. One of these involves the identification of sets of
component failures that can, when combined, lead to system
failure. These sets are known as cut sets, and FTA involves
logically determining minimal cut sets MCSs that lead to a
specific error event (the Top Event). It is also possible to
determine the probability of each node in the fault tree [12],
[13].
Binary Decision Diagrams (BDDs) have been used in the
context of FTA in order to allow for the efficient verification
of more expressive properties [14]. BDDs are an effective
method for describing Boolean expressions, applied in system
design and certification. In most cases, the use of BDDs to
describe Boolean expressions uses less storage space than other
methods. Whereas any BDD can be translated to an FTA
model, the converse is not true. FTA involves more factors
than can be modelled using a BDD, such as human factors and
environmental factors. BDDs have often been used to analyse
fault trees. The combination of FTA, with its rigorous logical
structure, tree pattern, and ability to reveal fault causes, and
BDDs which allow for the quantitative calculation of failure
probability, is a powerful technique when applied in the context
of reliability engineering. When BDDs are used in the context
of FTA, the fault tree is not analysed directly, but rather
an abstracted BDD representation. For this reason translation
errors may be introduced [15].
B. Real Time Techniques
There have been efforts in the past to introduce the notion
of real time to FTA. For example, in [16], a time-dependent
methodology for fault tree analysis is proposed in which time
is expressed as a function of the available information.
In other work, FTA has been augmented using temporal
formulas, time dependencies and temporal fault trees [17]–
[19]. The last two of these are extensions of traditional fault
trees and designed for the safety analysis of safety critical
systems.
Another popular methods that allow one to model time
is Stochastic Petri Nets (SPNs). SPNs allow one to cal-
culate aggregated performance values (in a similar way to
rewards in probabilistic model checking). Typical values that
are measured are the average number of tokens and average
token delay [20]. Transition delays are assumed to be random
variables from a negative exponential distribution.
Markov models (such as Discrete Time Markov Chains
(DTMCs), Markov Decision Processes (MDPs), and Contin-
uous Time Markov chains (CTMCs)) consist of a countable
set of states together with a probabilistic transition matrix
which determines the probability of moving between states
(or the associated rate, drawn from a probability distribution,
for CTMCs). MDPs allow us to also model non-deterministic
transitions. Markov models allow us to verify a range of
probabilistic properties, what is the maximum (minimum)
probability that the system reaches a given state within a
certain time period? Or: what is the expected fuel consumption
in the first 10 seconds? Markov models cannot address all
properties that can be verified using TFTs. An example of
such a property is: how long does it take for an error to occur,
after the initial failure has occured?
III. PROBABILISTIC MODEL CHECKING
In this paper, we present the analysis of probabilistic timed
automata using the PRISM probabilistic model checker [21].
A. Probabilistic Timed Automata
Full details about probabilistic timed automata (PTAs) can
be found in [22], [23]. We outline the important aspects in this
section.
PTAs allow us to use the real-valued clocks of timed
automata, together with the discrete probabilistic choice of
MDPs. PTAs have real-valued clocks and, like MDPs [24] and
therefore allow us to model systems with a range of different
characteristics (non-determinism, probability, and real time).
Fig. 1. An example of a probabilistic timed automaton.
In this section, we illustrate a number of basic PTA
concepts using the example in Fig. 1. The Figure illustrates a
probabilistic timed automaton, with clock t and integer variable
try, modelling a simple probabilistic communication protocol.
In the protocol, a sender repeatedly attempts to transmit a
message over an unreliable channel. The probability that the
sender’s transmission fails due to that the channel is unreliable
is 0.05, and the sender successfully transmit the message to
the receiver with probability 0.95. If message data from the
sender is lost, the sender suspends its activity, and there is a
delay (of between 4 and 6 time units) before the sender tries
to resend its message (up to M   1 times).
The control states of the automaton model, “state = 0”,
“state = 1”, “state = 2”, “state = 3”, have the meaning
of “transmit”, “wait”, “quit”, and “finish”respectively. They
are depicted as the nodes (circles) of the underlying graph,
and the available transmissions between these control states
are indicated as the edges (with arrow) of the graph. In
the initial state, “state = 0”, shown as the extra border, a
communication is being initialised by the sender along the
transmission channel. After between 2 and 3 time units, the
sender attempts to send the message, and with probability
0.95 message is sent correctly, meantime with probability 0.05
message is lost. In “s = 1”, when 4 to 6 time units have
elapsed from whenever the message is lost, the sender tries to
re-transmit the message.
Definition 1. A probabilistic timed automaton PTA is a tuple
of the form (L, l0,⌃, inv, prob) where:
• L = {l0, l1, l2, ..., ln} is a finite set of locations;
• l0 2 L is the initial location;
•   = {x, y, z, ...} is a finite set of clocks;
• ⌃ = {a, b, c, ...} is a finite set of events, of which
⌃u ✓ ⌃ are declared as being urgent;
• the function inv : L ! CC( ) is the invariant
condition;
• the finite set prob ✓ L⇥CC( )⇥⌃⇥Dist(2 ⇥L)
is the probabilistic edge relation.
Note that clocks are real-valued. The values of the clocks
synchronise and increase together over time. Transitions and
states may have guards and invariants over clock variables and
other variables which indicate when transitions can occur and
how long can be spent in a state. In our example, the transition
between states state = 0 and state = 1 (or state = 2) has
the clock guard t   2. The state state = 0 and state = 3
have the invariant t < 3 and t < 6 respectively.
The semantics of PTAs are formally defined as an infinite
state MDP. As clocks are real-valued the MDP will have an
infinite state-space (both in terms of set of states, and the set of
transitions). Since model-checking algorithms are designed to
work on finite state spaces, the analysis of PTAs requires some
form of abstraction, to a finite state representation. PTAs have
been used to verify a variety of protocols, e.g. the CSMA/CD
back-off protocol [25], the FireWire root contention protocol
[26], and the IPv4 Zeroconf protocol [22].
B. The Probabilistic Model Checker PRISM
PRISM is a probabilistic model checker, which can be
used to model, and verify systems that exhibit random or
probabilistic behaviour based on different types of probabilistic
models, such as DTMCs, CTMCs, MDPs, and PAs. PRISM has
recently incorporated support for the analysis of probabilistic
real-time systems, using PTAs. PRISM was developed and is
maintained by researchers from University of Oxford, Univer-
sity of Birmingham, and University of Glasgow in UK. It has
been used to analyse many different industrial applications,
such as communication and multimedia protocols, security
protocols, dynamic power management, biological systems,
and autonomous systems.
Fig. 2. A screenshot of the PRISM probabilisitic model checker.
In Fig. 2, we show the graphical user interface for PRISM
in which the results of a model checking experiment are
displayed. In this example a reachability property is being
verified and the graph shows how the maximum expected
number of steps varies with a defined property defined as
Reliability.
In order to verify a system using PRISM, models are
specified using a defined language (PRISM) in which different
components are defined as modules. A model of the entire
system is constructed by composing a number of modules in
a synchronous way. A module has the form:
module name ... endmodule
and consists of a list of variable declarations, followed by a list
of commands. The state of a model at any time is a snapshot
of the system consisting of an instantaneous valuation of all
the variables in the specification.
PTAs can be enhanced with rewards and costs, which
allow us to track the number of occurrences of a transition.
This might correspond to energy used or goals achieved. The
corresponding model is known as a priced PTA and it allows
us to measure accumulated rewards (reflected in properties
expressing the expected value of the rewards/costs). A further
extension is linearly priced PTAs, where costs or rewards are
accumulated linearly (with respect to the elapsed time) [27].
In Fig. 3 we illustrate the PRISM language by specifying
the example from Fig. 1. Note the use of rewards: a reward
of 3.5 is accumulated at state s = 0 whenever a message is
transmitted.
C. Continuous Stochastic Logic
In this paper our properties are expressed using Continuous
Stochastic Logic (CSL) [28], [29]. This logic is an extension
pta
const int M;
module sender
state : [0..3] init 0;
try : [0..M] init 0;
t : clock;
invariant
(state = 0 => t <= 3) & (state = 3 => t <= 6)
endinvariant
[transmit] state = 0 & t >= 1 & try < M -> 0.95 : (state’ = 1) +
0.05 : (state’ = 3) & (try’ = try+1) & (t’ = 0);
[retransmit] state = 3 & t >= 4 -> (state’ = 0) & (t’ = 0);
[terminate] state = 0 & try == M -> (state’ = 3);
endmodule
rewards ’’energy’’
(state=0) : 3;
endrewards
Fig. 3. The PRISM code of the probabilisitic timed automaton in Fig. 1.
of: Computation Tree Logic (CTL) [30]; probabilistic CTL
(PCTL), which is an extension of CTL for discrete time
stochastic systems (PCTL) [31]; and Timed CTL, which is an
extension of CTL for continuous time non-stochastic systems
(TCTL) [32]. Formulas in CSL are either state formulas (which
can be either true or false in any given state), and path formulas
which apply to entire paths in a model.
Definition 2. Let a 2 AP be an atomic proposition, p 2 [0, 1]
be a real number, ./ 2 {, <,>, } be a comparison operator,
and I ✓ R 0 be a non-empty interval. The syntax of CSL
formulas over the set of atomic propositions AP is defined
inductively as follows:
• true is a state-formula.
• Each a 2 AP is a state formula.
• If   and  are state formulas, then so are ¬  and
  ^ .
• If   is state formula, then so is S./p( ).
• If ' is a path formula, then P./p(').
• If   and  are state formulas, then XI  and  UI 
are path formulas.
Full details of CSL can be found in [28], [29]. Two of the
main type of CSL properties are:
• S./p( ): the steady-state probability for a state satis-
fying   satisfies . An example property is S0.5(x ==
4).
• P./p('): the probability measure of the paths sat-
isfying path property ' satisfies ./ p. An example
property is P 0.8(pUq) where p and q are defined
atomic propositions and U the until operator.
Another important class of property involves the P opera-
tor, which indicates the probability of an event. For example,
in this paper we use this operator within PRISM to calculate
the probability of a robot completing a task within 30 minutes
and within 15 minutes respectively.
It is also possible to express properties to measure cumula-
tive rewards using theR. We do not use properties of this form
in this paper, but examples of such properties can be found on
the Property Specification section of the PRISM website.
IV. FORMAL ANALYSIS
A. Formal Modelling of A Mars Exploration Rover
In this section, we present a case study to illustrate the role
of PTAs and probabilistic model checking for the analysis of
PMSs: a Mars exploration rover [33] exploring an unknown
region. The mission of Mars exploration rover can be expected
to be an instance of phased mission systems [34].
Fig. 4. NASA Mars exploration rover.
In Fig. 4, we illustrate the Mars exploration rover. The
key purpose of the mission of the Mars exploration rover
is to make it to pre-defined positions to undertake practical
and systematic explorations. Specifically, the Mars exploration
rover is planned to achieve different day-to-day conventional
missions. Based on [34], a number of major missions can
TABLE I. INTERVALS OF TIME-CONSUMPTION IN EACH AREA.
Direction 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
East 3 ⇠ 5 5 ⇠ 6 7 ⇠ 8 3 ⇠ 5 6 ⇠ 7     7 ⇠ 8 5 ⇠ 5 2 ⇠ 6
South         4 ⇠ 7 6 ⇠ 8 3 ⇠ 5 5 ⇠ 8 4 ⇠ 8  
West   4 ⇠ 6 7 ⇠ 8     5 ⇠ 8     4 ⇠ 5 4 ⇠ 6
North 2 ⇠ 5 3 ⇠ 6   4 ⇠ 5 5 ⇠ 7 6 ⇠ 8 4 ⇠ 5      
summarised as follows: (1) waking up at a specific time, (2)
receiving commands from the base on Earth, (3) navigating
to a specific destination, (4) carrying out surface operations,
(5) processing data and sending it to the base (downlink), and
(6) entering a sleep mode. The routine operations can consist
other phases to be performed according to individual mission,
we only analyse the underlying 6 phases that are commonly
used.
This example is common in the field of artificial intelli-
gence. The rover attempts to reach a destination by following
instructions from a controller. In this case, a rover moves to
the destination by command. A region is divided into 12 parts.
These consist of 11 numbered parts (numbered from 0 to 10)
and one blocked region which cannot be passed by the rover
(indicated by shading in Fig. 5).
7 8 9 10
0 1 2 3
4 5 6
+0.2 +0.4 +0.7 +1
+1.3 +0.9 +0.2
+1.2 +0.1 +0.2
Fig. 5. Energy Consumption of the Mars exploration rover in Each Area.
Suppose that the robot attempts to move from area 0 to area
10. The condition of the area must be evaluated, and the route
to area 10 planned. The robot starts from area 0, at which point
its explore direction is uncertain. The movement of the rover is
controlled externally by a human. However, due to uncertainty
of control, the robot will not always respond correctly. At any
point there is a 10% probability of deviation to the left and
10% probability of deviation to the right.
In this case, there are two further parameters: time and
energy. The time the robot spends in each area moving in
each direction varies. The time spent in each area is given as
an interval between specified minimal and maximal times. The
energy the robot uses in each area also varies. Fig. 5 indicates
the energy consumption in each area. Table I shows the time
spent by the robot in each area moving in each direction.
Fig. 6. Probability distribution of the Mars exploration rover completing the
task within a given time.
On collision with the boundary of the obstacle and the
perimeter of the exploration area, the robot will be bounced
back, and have to re-select the path of the route. For example,
when the robot gets the command that it should move forward
to area 4 from area 0, there is an 80% probability that it
will complete the task, a 10% probability that it will hit
the exploration perimeter and return to area 0, and a 10%
probability that it will move to area 1.
Fig. 8 shows the PRISM code for the PTA models shown in
Fig. 7. It includes a reward declaration, denoted as “energy”,
to create a priced probabilistic timed automaton that associates
states with different cost rates.
B. Uncertainty Analysis
Using the model checker PRISM, we show that the prob-
ability of the robot completing the task within 30 minutes is
.84134. The probability of the robot completing the task within
15 minutes is .05184. Fig. 6 shows the relationship between
the probability and time to complete the task.
The PTA model in the case of minimal energy consumption
is shown in Fig. 7(a). The route of the robot in this case is
as shown in Fig. 9(a). The optimal route is: 0 ! 1 ! 5 !
8! 9! 10. The minimum energy consumption of the robot
moving from area 0 to area 10 is 13.3W. If the direction of the
robot deviates, the robot should reroute from its new position
in such a way as to minimise energy consumption.
The PTA model in the case of minimal time consumption
is as shown in Fig. 7(b). The shortest path is as shown in
Fig. 9(b). The best route is: 0 ! 4 ! 7 ! 8 ! 9 ! 10.
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(a) Probabilistic timed automaton w.r.t. minimum energy consumption.
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(b) Probabilistic timed automaton w.r.t. minimal time.
Fig. 7. Probabilistic timed automata (PTAs) models of the Mars exploration rover.
pta
module rover
s : [0..10] init 0;
x : clock;
invariant
(s = 0 => x <=5 ) & (s = 1 => x <= 6) & (s = 2 => x <=8 ) &
(s = 3 => x <= 5) & (s = 4 => x <=7 ) & (s = 5 => x <= 8) &
(s = 6 => x <=5 ) & (s = 7 => x <= 8) & (s = 8 => x <=5 ) &
(s = 9 => x <= 6) & (s = 0 => x <=a ) & (s = 1 => x <= b) &
(s = 2 => x <=c ) & (s = 3 => x <= d) & (s = 4 => x <=e ) &
(s = 5 => x <= f) & (s = 6 => x <=g ) & (s = 7 => x <= h) &
(s = 8 => x <=i ) & (s = 9 => x <= j)
endinvariant
[] s =0 & x >= 3 -> 0.8 : (s’ = 4) + 0.1 : (s’ = 0) + 0.1 : (s’ = 1);
[] s = 4 & x >= 2 -> (s’ = 4) & (x’ = 0);
[] s = 4 & x >= 2 -> 0.05 : (s’ = 0) + 0.05 : (s’ = 4) + 0.1 : (s’ = 5) +
0.8 : (s’=7);
[] s = 0 & x >= 2 -> (s’ = 0) & (x’ = 0);
endmodule
reward ’’energy’’
(s = 0) : 0.2; (s = 1) : 0.4; (s = 2) : 0.7; (s = 3) : 1.0;
(s = 4) : 1.3; (s = 5) : 0.9; (s = 6) : 0.2; (s = 7) : 1.2;
(s = 8) : 0.1; (s = 9) : 0.2;
endreward
Fig. 8. The PRISM code for the the Mars exploration rover.
Similarly, the time the robot spends moving from area 0 to
area 10 is at least 22.8 minutes. There is one best direction
to take in each area. Once the robot enters an area, it should
reroute from its new position in such a way as to minimise
time consumption.
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper we consider an automated verification ap-
proach: probabilistic model checking, to analyse phased mis-
sion systems. A Probabilistic timed automaton is used to
solve an uncertainty problem in PMS analysis. Using an
example, we show how to construct PTAs for PMSs and
use probabilistic model checking techniques to analyse the
resulting models. The aim of the paper is to promote the
adoption of PTAs and probabilistic model checking within this
context. We have illustrated our approach using a simple case
study involving a Mars explorer robot, for which we verify
quantitative properties using the PRISM model checker.
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